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Abstract
We develop a model with many heterogeneous advertisers (products) and advertising
markets (media). Each advertiser has a di¤erent consumer segment for its product, and
each medium has a di¤erent ability to target advertisement messages. We characterize
the competitive equilibrium in the media markets and investigate the role of targeting
for the price and allocation of advertisements across media markets.
An increase in the targeting ability leads to an increase in the total number of
purchases (matches), and hence in the social value of advertisements. Yet, an improved
targeting ability also increases the concentration of advertising rms in each market.
Surprisingly, we nd that the equilibrium price for advertisements is decreasing in the
targeting ability over a large range of parameter values.
We trace out the implications of targeting for competing media markets. We dis-
tinguish o­ ine and online media by their targeting ability: low versus high. We show
that competition by an online medium lowers the revenue of the o­ ine medium more
than competition by another o­ ine medium of the same size.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade the internet has become an increasingly important medium for adver-
tising. The arrival of the internet has had important consequences on the market position
of many traditional media, i.e. o­ ine media such as print, audio and television. For some
of these media, most notably the daily newspapers, the very business model is under the
threat of extinction due to competition from the internet for the placement of advertising.
The following chart shows the dramatic changes in aggregate spending for advertising on
di¤erent media between 2004 and 2008.1
Figure 1: U.S. Advertising Markets: Revenue Comparison
At the same time, through a variety of technological advances, the internet has allowed
many advertisers to address a targeted audience beyond the reach of traditional media. In
fact, it has been argued that the distinguishing feature of internet advertising is its ability
to convey information to a targeted audience. In particular, targeting improves the quality
of the match between the consumer and the advertisement message, and enables smaller
businesses to access advertising markets from which they were previously excluded.2 While
this holds for display advertising, it is even more true for sponsored search, where the
individual consumer declares her intent or preference directly, by initiating a query.
The objective of this paper is to develop a model of competition between the o­ ine
(traditional) and the online (new) media, in which the distinguishing feature of the online
1Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers annual reports for the Interactive Advertising Bureau.
2Anderson (2006) refers to this phenomenon as the long tail of advertising.
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media is the ability to (better) target advertisement messages to their intended audience. We
investigate the role of targeting in the determination of (a) the allocation of advertisements
across di¤erent media, and (b) the equilibrium price for advertising. For this purpose, we
rst develop a framework to analyze the role of targeting, and then use this to model to
analyze the interaction between o­ ine and online advertising.
We present a model in which advertising creates awareness for a product. We consider
an economy with a continuum of buyers and a continuum of products. Each product has
a potential market size which describes the mass of consumers who are contemplating to
purchase it. Each consumer is contemplating only one of the available products, and the
role of the advertisement is to generate a match between product and consumer. The
placement of an advertisement constitutes a message from the advertiser to a group of
consumers. If the message is received by a consumer who is interested in the advertisers
product, the potential customer turns into an actual customer and a purchase is realized.
A message received by a customer who is not in the market for the product in question is
irretrievably lost and generates no tangible benet for the advertiser. At the same time, a
potential customer might be reached by multiple and hence redundant messages from the
same advertiser. Consequently, the probability that a potential customer is turned into an
actual customer is an increasing but concave function of the number of messages sent.
We begin the analysis with a single advertising market in which all consumers are present
and can be reached by any advertiser. It is useful to think of the single advertising market
as a national platform, such as the nationwide newspapers or the major television networks.
We show that in this market only the largest rms, measured by the size of their potential
market, purchase any advertising space. We also show that the concentration of consumer
types (i.e. the degree of asymmetry in the rmspotential market sizes) has an initially
positive, but eventually negative e¤ect on the equilibrium price of messages.
We then introduce the possibility of targeting by introducing a continuum of advertising
markets. Each advertising market is characterized by the number of messages that it can
send out to its audience. While each consumer is at most present in one advertising market,
the likelihood of her presence in a specic market is correlated with her potential interest.
For concreteness, the distribution of consumers across advertising markets is assumed to
have a triangular structure. Namely, a consumer of type x is located with positive proba-
bility in one of the advertising markets labeled k  x, and is located with zero probability
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in advertising markets k > x. We assume that the distribution of the consumers across the
advertising markets is given by an exponential distribution parametrized by . As each con-
sumer segment becomes more concentrated in a few advertising markets, the probability of a
match between consumers and advertisements increases. In consequence, the social welfare
is increasing with the ability of the advertisers to reach their preferred audience. We then
investigate the equilibrium advertising prices as the degree of targeting improves. While
the marginal product of each message is increasing in the targeting ability, thus potentially
increasing the prices for the advertisement, a second and more powerful e¤ect appears. As
consumers become more concentrated, the competition among di¤erent advertisers becomes
weaker. In fact, each advertiser focuses his attention on a few important advertising mar-
kets and all but disappears from the other advertising markets. In consequence, the price
of advertising is declining in the degree of targeting, even though the value of advertising
is increasing. The number of participating advertisers shows a similarly puzzling behavior.
While improved targeting increases the total number of advertisers participating across all
markets  by allowing smaller advertisers to appear  it reduces the number of actively
advertising rms in each specic market k.
In the second part of the paper we introduce competition among advertising markets
(media) for the attention of the consumer. Thus, while each consumer is still only interested
in one product, he can now receive a message from an advertiser on two di¤erent media
markets. A single message received through either one of the markets is su¢ cient to create
a sale. The dual-homingof the consumer across the two media markets may then lead
to duplicative e¤orts by the advertisers, who therefore view messages in the two competing
markets as strategic substitutes. We rst describe the advertising allocation when the com-
petitors are both traditional media without any targeting ability. In this case, messages on
the two media are perfect substitutes, and the equilibrium prices are equalized. Further-
more, the allocation of messages only depends on the total supply, not on its distribution
across media.
The competition among two o­ ine media markets presents a useful benchmark when
we next consider competition between an o­ ine and an online market. We analyze the
interaction of o­ ine media such as newspapers or TV with online media, such as display
(banner) and sponsored search advertisements. Display advertisements allow for targeting
through superior knowledge of the consumers preferences (attribute targeting). Sponsored
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keyword search advertisements allow advertisers to infer the consumers preferences from her
actions (behavioral targeting). As expected, competition lowers the price of advertisement
on the traditional medium. However, the online medium lowers the revenue of the o­ ine
medium more than competition by another o­ ine medium of the same size.
This paper is related to several strands in the literature on advertising. Anderson and
Coate (2005) provide the rst model of competing broadcasters, with exclusive assignment
of viewers to stations; their setup is extended by Ferrando, Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac
(2004), and Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) to the case of non-exclusive assignments. However,
the role of targeting for the structure of advertising markets has received scant attention in
the literature. The most prominent exception is Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas (2005),
who analyze the strategic choice of advertising in an imperfectly competitive market with
product di¤erentiation. In their model, the consumers are segmented into di¤erent audiences
that the rms can target with advertising messages. However, Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-
Boas (2005) are mostly concerned with the equilibrium product prices that result from
the competitive advertising strategies. In contrast, we take the product prices as given,
and focus our attention on the equilibrium prices of the advertising messages themselves.
Our results on equilibrium advertising prices and competing media are in line with recent
empirical work by Goldfarb and Tucker (2009), who exploit the variation in targeting ability
generated by the legal framework across states. They show that prices for sponsored search
advertising are higher when regulations limit the o­ ine alternatives for targeted advertising.
In another empirical study, Chandra (2009) relates the degree of segmentation (targeting) of
a newspapers subscriber base to the price it charges for the advertising space. The results
imply a substantial benet to advertisers and media rms from targeted advertising, and
see Chandra and Kaiser (2010) for additional evidence from the magazine markets.
In this paper, we model the market for advertisements as a competitive market and
the allocation of advertising messages is determined by the competitive equilibrium price.
Each advertising message generates a match between a product and a potential customer.
The present interpretation of advertising as matching products and users is shared with
recent papers, such as Athey and Ellison (2008) and Chen and He (2006). Yet, in these
contributions, the primary focus is on the welfare implications of position auctions in a
search model where consumers are uncertain about the quality of the match. Similarly,
several recent papers, Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) and Varian (2007) among
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others, focus on the specic mechanisms used in practice to sell advertising messages online,
such as auctions for sponsored links in keyword searches.
Finally, in closely related work, Athey and Gans (2010) analyze the impact of targeting
on the supply and price of advertising. In their model, targeting improves the e¢ ciency
of the allocation of messages, and leads to an increase in demand. However, as long as
advertisement space can be freely expanded, the revenue e¤ects of targeting could also be
obtained by increasing the supply of (non targeted) messages, yielding an equivalence result.
More generally, Athey and Gans (2010) show that supply-side e¤ects mitigate the value of
targeting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium in a single advertising market. Section 4 generalizes
the analysis to many advertising markets. Section 5 extends the analysis by allowing each
consumer to be present in many advertising markets. Section 6 investigates the competition
between o­ ine and online media. Section 7 reconsiders the equilibrium in a single adver-
tising market when one or more publishers control the supply of advertising messages. The
Appendix collects the formal proofs of all propositions in the main body of the text.
2 Model
We consider a model with a continuum of products and a continuum of advertising markets.
Each product x is o¤ered by rm x with x 2 [0;1). The advertising markets are indexed
by k 2 [0;1). There is a continuum of buyers with unit mass and each buyer is present
in exactly one product market and one advertising market. The consumers population is
jointly distributed across products x and advertising markets k according to F (x; k), with
a density f (x; k). The market share of product x is given by the marginal distribution,




f (x; k) dk. (1)
Firms are ranked, without loss of generality, in decreasing order of market share, so sx is
decreasing in x. Similarly, the size of the advertising market k is given by the marginal
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f (x; k) dx. (2)
Each buyer is only interested in one specic product x. A sale of product x occurs if
and only if the buyer is interested in the product and she receives at least one message from
rm x. A message by rm x is hence only e¤ective if it is received by a buyer in segment x.
In other words, we adopt the complementary view of advertising (see Bagwell (2007)), in
which both the message and the right receiver are necessary to generate a purchase. Each
sale generates a gross revenue of $1, constant across all product markets.
The advertising policy of rm x determines the number of messages mx;k it distributes
in advertising market k. Each message of advertiser x reaches a random consumer in
advertising market k with uniform probability. Given the size of the advertising market sk
and the message volume mx;k, the probability that a given consumer in market k is aware
of product x is then given by:
 (mx;k; sk) , 1  e mx;k=sk . (3)
We refer to  (mx;k; sk) as the awareness level for product x in advertising market k. The
exponential form of the matching probability (3) is a result of the uniform random matching
process. Suppose a large number of messages, denoted by m, is distributed with uniform
probability across a large number of agents, denoted by s.3 We then ask what is the
probability that a representative agent has received none out of the m messages. This
probability is given by:
(1  1=s)m:
Now, by the denition of the exponential function, we have that:
lim
m;s!1
(1  1=s)m = e m=s,
3An early version of this paper considered a model with an innite, but countable number, of advertisers
and consumers. The current model with a continuum of advertisers can be viewed as the limit of the
countable model. We present here the continuum model as it has the advantage that all marginal conditions
are exact, rather than subject to integer constraints. The results in the countable and continuum models
are identical up to the integer constraints.
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and the complementary probability is then given (3).
The allocation of buyers across product and advertising markets is assumed to be gov-
erned by an exponential distribution. In particular, the market share of product x is given
by:
sx , e x. (4)
The parameter   0 measures the concentration in the product market, and a large value
of  represents a more concentrated product market. In turn, the conditional distribution






e x; if k = 0;
e (x k); if k  x;
0; if k > x:
(5)
The parameter   0 measures the concentration of the consumers in the advertising
markets. A larger value of  represents a heavier concentration of more consumers in
fewer advertising markets. The distributions of consumers across markets and products are
conditionally independent. The corresponding unconditional market shares are given by:
sx;k ,
8>><>>:
e (+)x; if k = 0;
e (+)xek; if k  x;
0; if k > x:
For  > 0, the distribution of consumers over product and advertising markets has a trian-
gular structure. The consumers who are interested in product x are present in all advertising
markets k  x, but are not present in the advertising markets k > x.
The distribution of consumers across a one-dimensional product space and a one-dimensional
advertising space has a natural interpretation in terms of specialization of preferences and
audiences. In this interpretation, a product with a larger index x represents a more special-
ized product with a smaller market. Correspondingly, an advertising market with a larger
index k represents an advertising medium with a narrower audience. To give a precise exam-
ple, consider the market for bicycles. Here, products naturally range from mass-produced
comfort bikes, to quality-produced tness bikes, to high-end racing bikes with successively
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smaller market shares. Similarly, there is a natural range of advertising markets, from daily
newspapers with a large audience, to monthly magazine with well-dened audience such
as Sports Illustrated, to narrowly focused publications, such as Velonews. Now, the
triangular structure of the joint distribution implies that the consumer with an interest in
racing bikes may read either one of the publications, but that a consumer with interest in
tness bikes does not read Velonews,and by extension that a consumer with an interest
in comfort bikes does not read Velonews nor Sports Illustrated. In other words, the
triangular structure represents a positive but less than perfect correlation of the prefer-
ence and the audience characteristics of a consumer. The specic feature of the triangular
structure, namely the unidirectional di¤usion of the consumer x across advertising markets
k  x, is not essential for the qualitative character of our results, but allow us to represent
the strength of the targeting in a singe variable, namely the parameter  of the exponential
distribution.
As we vary the targeting measure  from 0 to 1, we change the distribution and the
concentration in each advertising market. With  = 0, all consumers are located in the
single large advertising market k = 0. As we increase , an increasing fraction of consumers
of type x move from the large market to the smaller markets and as  !1, all consumers
of type x are exclusively present in advertising market k = x. The limit values of , namely
 = 0 and  = 1, represent two special market structures. If  = 0, then all consumers
are present in advertising market 0 and hence there is a single advertising market. If, on
the other hand,  !1, then all consumers of product x are present in advertising market
x, and hence we have advertising markets with perfect targeting. The left panel of Figure
2 illustrates the cross section of how the customers of a rm are distributed across the
advertising market (for several rms). The mass points indicate the number of consumers
of each rm that are present in market 0. The right panel shows how an advertising market
hosts consumers of di¤erent rms (for several advertising markets).
Finally, the supply of messages Mk in every advertising market k is proportional to the
size sk of the advertising market and given by
Mk , sk M;
for some constant M > 0. The constant M can be interpreted as the attention or time
9
Figure 2: Distribution of Consumers across Product Markets and Advertising Markets




























Parameter Values: λ=1/4, γ=1
Product market x=1
Product market x=3





























t Parameter Values: λ=1/4, γ=1
Advertising market k=3
Advertising market k=1
that each consumer allocates to receiving messages on the advertising market where he is
located. We think of each advertising market k as the market for attention by a given set
of consumers. For example, we may interpret each advertising market as a local, regional
or national market for newspaper readers, radio listeners or TV audience. The equilibrium
price pk for messages placed in advertising market k is then determined by the market
clearing condition in market k. We only depart from the competitive equilibrium paradigm
in Section 7. There we investigate the equilibrium allocation where a single (or multiple)
publisher controls the supply of messages. In particular, we allow the publisher to o¤er a
nonlinear pricing schedule of the message volume purchased.
3 Single Advertising Market
We begin the equilibrium analysis with the benchmark of a single advertising market. In
other words, consumers of all product market segments are present in a single advertising
market k = 0. In terms of the distribution of the consumers over the advertising markets, it
corresponds to setting  = 0. Each rm x can now reach its consumers by placing messages
in the single advertising market k = 0. Consequently, in this section we drop the subscript
k in the notation without loss of generality. The objective of each rm x is to maximize the
prot given the unit price for advertising p. The prot x is given by:
x = max
mx
[sx (mx)  pmx] .
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An advertising policy mx generates a gross revenue sx  (mx). The information technology
 (mx), given by (3), determines the probability that a representative consumer is aware of
product x, and sx is the proportion of buyers who are in market segment x. The cost of
an advertising policy mx is given by p mx. The optimal demand of messages by rm x is
determined by the rst order conditions and yields a demand function:
mx = ln (sx /p) :
It is an implication of the above optimality conditions that rms with a larger market share
sx choose to send more messages to the consumers. In consequence, at the equilibrium
price, the rms with the largest market share choose to advertise. Let [0; X] be the set of
participating rms, whereX is the marginal rm, and letM be the total supply of messages.




Using the optimal demand of rm x and the formula for product market shares (4), we
obtain Z X
0
(ln ( /p)  x) dx =M . (6)
The equilibrium price and participation are now determined by imposing mX = 0 and







2M / . (8)
By using these formulas in the equilibrium expressions, we obtain the competitive equilib-




2M   x; if x  X;
0; if x > X:
(9)
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To summarize, in the competitive equilibrium, the X largest rms enter the advertising
market and the remaining smaller rms stay out of the advertising market. With the
exponential distribution of consumers across products, the number of messages sent by an
active rm is linear in its rank x in the market. The set of participating rms, the number
of messages and the equilibrium price change continuously in  and M . We determine how
the equilibrium allocation depends on the primitives of the advertising market, namely 
and M , in the following comparative statics results.
Proposition 1 (Single Market, Comparative Statics)
1. The equilibrium demand of messages mx is increasing in  for all x  X=2.
2. The number of advertising rms X is increasing in M and decreasing in .
3. The equilibrium price p is decreasing in M for all .
4. The equilibrium price p is increasing in  i¤  < 2=M .
5. The price per consumer reached is increasing in x. It is decreasing in  for x  X=2.
6. The social value of advertising is increasing in .
As the message volumeM of the advertising market increases, the number of participat-
ing rms X also increases. The population of consumers is segmented in many categories.
As the market becomes more concentrated in fewer categories, the number of actively ad-
vertising rms is decreasing as well. The equilibrium price responds in a more subtle way to
the concentration measure  in the product market. If the product market is di¤use, then
an increase in the concentration measure essentially increases the returns from advertising
for most of the participating rms. In other words, the demand of the inframarginal rms
has a larger e¤ect on the price than the demand of the smaller, the marginal, rms. If on
the other hand, the concentration in the product market is already large, then a further
increase in the concentration weakens the marginal rms demand for advertising. At the
same time, as the market share of the large rms is already substantial, their increase in
demand for advertising is not su¢ cient to pick up the decrease in demand of the marginal
rm. The additional demand of the large rm is weak because an increase in the already
large advertising volume leads to many more redundant messages, which do not generate
12
additional sales. Figure 3 shows the market demand and supply for di¤erent values of the
concentration measure .
Figure 3: Demand and Supply, Di¤erent Concentration Measures



















The dichotomy in the comparative static is thus driven by the determination of the
marginal demand for advertising. If the source of the marginal demand is the marginal
rm, then the price goes down with an increase in , and likewise if the marginal demand
is driven by the inframarginal rms, then the advertising price is increasing with . In this
sense, the non monotonic behavior of prices is not specic to the exponential distribution
of rmsmarket shares. On the contrary, it is a consequence of the natural tension between
competition and concentration.
Finally, notice that the competitive equilibrium implements the socially e¢ cient alloca-
tion of advertisement messages (given ). An easy way to see this is that with a uniform
unit price of messages, the marginal returns to ads bought by di¤erent rms are equalized.
A natural question is how does the social value of advertising depend on the product market
concentration. Consider holding the allocation mx xed, and increasing . Now the total
market share of the participating rms has increased, and fewer messages get lost. At
the new equilibrium, welfare will be even higher, as the allocation is adjusted for the new
relative market shares of di¤erent products. In consequence, social welfare is increasing in
the concentration measure.
One may wonder how relaxing the assumption of perfectly inelastic supply a¤ects the
comparative statics result in Proposition 1. For the case of constant supply elasticity q =
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Mp", we can show that the equilibrium price retains the same comparative static properties:
it is rst increasing, then decreasing in . Moreover, as M becomes larger, the equilibrium
price will be increasing in  over a larger range. In particular, when the product market
is very concentrated (so that the marginal demand is low), a more elastic supply reduces
the number of active rms in the market. A further increase in concentration may then
increase the demand of the active rms, and therefore also the price. But for high values
of , it continues to hold that the demand falls o¤fast enough that the equilibrium price
decreases. In particular, as  goes to innity, both the price and the quantity traded go to
zero. However, since an increase in  causes a drop in the quantity sold, the welfare result
with respect to an increase in the concentration measure  now becomes ambiguous.
We observe that we assumed that the value of a match is constant across product
markets. The introduction of product specic prot margins which may be thought of as
the value of a match would a¤ects the equilibrium price and the distribution of messages.
In the case of exponentially declining prot levels, the rate of decrease of prots plays a role
similar to that of the concentration parameter . Intuitively, faster declining prots imply a
more skewed equilibrium allocation of messages. As the prot margins are declining faster,
the competitive equilibrium displays a decline in the number of participating rms.
4 Many Advertising Markets
We are now in a position to analyze the general model with a continuum of advertising
markets. The model with a single advertising market was described by  = 0 and we now
allow the targeting parameter  to be strictly positive. The case of perfect targeting is
described by  =1. We described the distribution of consumers over di¤erent advertising
markets by a (truncated) exponential distribution. We recall that the share of consumers





e x; if k = 0;
e (x k); if k  x;
0; if k > x:
The share of consumers active in product market x and located in advertising market k = 0
is given by the residual probability of the product market segment x. As a result, the
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The volume of advertising messages is assumed to be proportional to the population size
of advertising market k, hence Mk = skM . The common factor M again expresses the
attention devoted to advertising messages by the consumers.
An important implication of the exponential distribution across advertising and product
markets is a certain stationarity in the composition over the consumers across the advertising








for all x  k and all n  0. Thus, while the exact composition of each advertising market is
di¤erent, the size distribution of the competing advertisers are constant across advertising
markets. The stationarity property allows us to transfer many of the insights of the single
advertising market to the world with many advertising markets.




The rst order condition for the rms problem is given by




We can use (12), the market clearing condition, and the denition of the marginal rm in
market k, given by mXk ;k = 0. We then obtain the following equilibrium conditions:Z Xk
k
mx;kdx = skM ,
15
and
sXk ;k=sk = pk.
We can now characterize the equilibrium prices pk, the number active rms X

k   k, and
the allocation mx;k of messages. In particular, the price and the number of active rms are
stationary in the index k of the advertising market, that is:




Xk   k =
p
2M= ( + ), (14)




2M=( + )  (x  k)); if k > 0,
(
p
2M=( + )  x); if k = 0.
(15)
Clearly, the larger rms x  k receive a higher fraction of the message supply. If in particular
we consider rm x = k, then the number of messages it receives is also increasing in the
targeting ability.
The stationarity of the equilibrium prices implies that the marginal utility of an addi-
tional message is equalized across markets. We therefore have the following result.
Proposition 2 (E¢ ciency)
1. The e¢ cient allocation of a xed advertising space M is proportional to the size of
the advertising market: Mk = sk M .
2. The competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient.
3. The social value of advertising is strictly increasing in the targeting ability .
To understand the implications of targeting on social welfare, consider the relative size
of consumer segment x in advertising market k = x:
sx;x
sk=x
=  + .
We observe that better targeting increases the value that rm x assigns to a message in
the advertising market k = x. Now let us consider holding the allocation of messages mx;k
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constant, and increasing the degree of targeting . The volume of matched consumers and
rms is increasing because of the shift in the relative sizes of advertising markets. Since we
know that the competitive allocation of messages is Pareto e¢ cient, the equilibrium (for
the new ) has unambiguously improved the social value of advertising.
The comparative statics results (with respect to  and M) do not di¤er qualitatively
from the case of a single competitive market. More importantly, the e¤ect of targeting
ability  and product market concentration  on the equilibrium allocation is remarkably
similar. In particular, the response of prices to changes in the concentration measure  may
be generalized as follows:
sign (@pk /@) = sign (2 /M     ) .
In particular, prices are increasing in  if both the concentration and targeting parameters
are low enough. We now focus on the comparative statics with respect to , where a higher
 means more precise targeting. We dene the equilibrium advertising revenues on each
advertising market k as Rk , skpk.
Proposition 3 (Role of Targeting)
1. The number of messages per capita mx;k=sk is increasing in  i¤ x < (k +X

k) =2.
2. The number of participating rms Xk   k is decreasing in .
3. The equilibrium price pk is increasing in  i¤ +  < 2=M .
4. The equilibrium revenue R0 is decreasing in . The revenues R

k>0 are increasing in
 i¤  < (1 +
p
1 + 2M)=M .
The equilibrium number of messages mx;k is increasing in  for the participating rms
larger than the median rm active on each market k. Furthermore, more precise targeting
implies a lower number of active rms. The relationship between targeting ability and
equilibrium price is generally inverse-U shaped. However, if either M or  are large, then
pk is decreasing in  for all values of . In other words, despite the increased social value of
advertising, the equilibrium price of advertising is decreasing in the targeting ability over a
large range of parameter values. In terms of revenues, it is immediate to see from equations
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(10) and (11) that an increase in  leads to an increase in the size of markets k > 0 and
to a decrease in the size of market 0. Since prices are constant, revenues in market 0
are decreasing in . Finally, targeting has the same qualitative e¤ect on the equilibrium
revenues in all markets k > 0.
We now come back to the similar e¤ects of concentration and targeting. In particular,
as with product market concentration, an increase in targeting  reduces the demand of the
marginal rm on each advertising market k. At the same time, better targeting increases the
demand of the inframarginal rms. The underlying tension is the one between identifying a
consumer segment precisely, and nding several (competing) advertisers who are interested
in it. The resulting trade-o¤ between competition and inframarginal willingness to pay
applies to a number of contexts, such as generic vs. specic keyword searches, and more or
less precise attributes targeting on social networks.
This trade-o¤ may be ameliorated if the media can o¤er a menu of advertising policies
rather than sell the advertising messages at a single, competitive unit price. In the context of
our model, menu pricing is equivalent to block sales of messages. This additional instrument
may allow publishers to extract (a fraction of) the inframarginal rents, and therefore to serve
a limited number of advertisers without su¤ering from decreasing marginal returns. We shall
discuss the impact and limits of menu pricing in Section 7.
To conclude this section, we should point out that the exponential distributions over
advertising and product markets provide particularly tractable expressions. But for robust-
ness, we have also derived the main results under the alternative assumption of Pareto-
distributed consumers over product and advertising markets. The key di¤erence with the
exponential distribution lies in the fat tails (and hence decreasing hazard rate) of the Pareto
distribution. In the product markets, this means two niche (high x) products have more sim-
ilar relative market shares, compared to two mass (low x) products. Analogously, consumers
in smaller advertising markets are relatively more dispersed than in larger advertising mar-
kets. It follows that, in small advertising markets, the marginal and inframarginal rms
have more similar message demands under the Pareto than under the exponential distrib-
ution. The number of active rms in each advertising market is then no longer a constant,
but rather it is increasing in k. In consequence, the message demand of the marginal rm
in each market k is decreasing in k, and therefore so are the equilibrium prices pk.
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5 Media Competition
In this section, we deploy our model of general and targeted advertising markets as a frame-
work to provide insights into the e¤ects of competition between new and established media.
For this reason, we shall weaken the single-homing assumption to allow each consumer to
be present in multiple media. A rst e¤ect of competition is then to multiply the oppor-
tunities for matching an advertiser with a customer. At the same time, we maintain all
the assumptions of the previous sections, namely that each buyer is only interested in one
product, and that one message is su¢ cient to generate a sale.
We initially consider competition between traditional media, i.e. sellers of non-targeted
messages, where each advertising medium is described by a single advertising market. For
example, this may represent the competition between nation-wide TV broadcasting and
nation-wide newspaper publishers. We initially abstract away from the role of targeting,
in order to trace out the implications of (a) the number of consumers present on each
market, and (b) the distribution of consumer characteristics in each market. The analysis
of competition between traditional advertising markets can shed light on the interaction of
new and established (o­ ine and online) media along at least two dimensions. First, a new
market is likely to have an initially smaller user base. As a consequence, advertisement
messages have a more narrow reach, though a smaller market makes it easier to reach a
large fraction of the audience. Second, the main feature of a targeted, online advertising
market is a higher concentration of consumers of a particular product, compared to a
traditional market. Therefore, the degree of product market concentration, which we focus
on here, plays a similar role to the degree of advertising market targeting of Section 4. In
particular, di¤erences in market concentration lead rms to sort into those markets where
their messages have a higher probability of forming a match with the desired customer
population. Furthermore, our results show that the availability of a new market with a
smaller user base induces the largest advertisers to buy messages on both markets. These
rms purchase a constant number of advertising messages in the (new) smaller market. As
a result, some medium-sizedrms have a relatively larger presence on the new market,
compared to the single market case.
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5.1 Competition by Symmetric O­ ine Media
We begin the analysis with a model of competition between two traditional media. The two
media have the same distribution of consumer characteristics in their respective advertising
markets. This model provides a useful benchmark to understand the e¤ects of di¤erent user
bases and consumer distributions. Therefore, we consider two media, A and B, competing
for advertisers. Let mx;j denote the number of messages bought by rm x on advertis-
ing market j 2 fA;Bg, and denote by Mj the exogenous supply of advertising space on
each market. We can also interpret the supply of messages as the time the representative
consumer spends on each media (market).
As in our baseline model, the fraction of consumers reached by rm x on advertising
market j is given by
x;j , 1  e mx;j .
The main novel feature of media competition is that each rm x views messages displayed
in advertising markets A and B as (perfect) substitutes. We can therefore dene the total
awareness level generated by rm x as
x (mx;A;mx;B) , x;A + x;B   x;Ax;B = 1  e mx;A mx;B .
As each consumer is dual-homing, there is a loss in the frequency of productive matches
generated by messages in market A because the consumer may have received a duplicate
message in market B (and conversely). The distribution of consumers in product markets
(x) is common to the two media (j), and it is given by sx =  exp ( x). Each rm then
maximizes the following prot function:




It follows that the demand function of rm x in market j is given by
mx;j = ln (=pj) mx; j   x.
This expression di¤ers from the demand function in a single advertising market only because




total number of messages demanded by rm x, and we describe the equilibrium allocation
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (O­ ine Media)









2 (MA +MB)  x, for x  X,
X =
p
2 (MA +MB) =.
Since the messages on the two markets are perfect substitutes, it is intuitive that the
equilibrium prices must also be identical. The number of active rms X in equilibrium
reects the increase in the total supply of messages (MA + MB), but it is not directly
a¤ected by competition between the two markets, and it is otherwise analogous to the case
of a single advertising market.
In this symmetric model, the equilibrium allocation of messages is not characterized
in terms of each mx;j . This is because perfect substitutability of messages across the two
media leads to an indeterminacy in the division of message purchased across the two media.
In particular, both media specialization in which each rm x  X purchases messages
exclusively on one market and proportional representation of advertisers on each market,
may occur in equilibrium.
Finally, notice that the equilibrium revenues of market j are non monotonic in the
supply level Mj and decreasing in M j . Therefore, if we considered Mj as a strategic
variable  such as a capacity choice  then market interaction would be analogous to a
game of quantity competition between the two media. We address the role of endogenous
supply decisions in Section 7.
5.2 Media Markets of Di¤erent Size
We now turn to the e¤ects of introducing a new advertising medium with a smaller user base,
which is visited only by a subset of the consumers. To capture this asymmetry between the
new and the established medium in a simple way, let the number of consumers present on
(new) market B be given by   1. Furthermore, all consumers who visit the new medium
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B also visit the established medium A. For example, one may think of the early days of
online advertising, or more recently about new online advertising channels (such as social
networks).
We normalize the supply of messages per capita toMj in each market j. Since each rm
x can reach a subset of its customers on the new market B, the prot function is given by
x = e




Whenever rm x buys a positive number of messages on both media, the rst order condi-








Notice that mx;A is decreasing as usual, while mx;B is a constant. In equilibrium, we can
identify two thresholds, X and Z, such that rms x 2 [0; X] buy messages on both markets,
while rms x 2 [X;Z] only buy on market B. We describe the equilibrium allocation in the
following proposition, and then discuss its properties.
Proposition 5 (New Advertising Medium)
1. The equilibrium allocation of messages in the established market A is:
mx;A =
p
2MA   x, for x 
p
2MA=.











2 (MA +MB)  x); for
p
2MA= < x 
p
2 (MA +MB) =.











Figure 4 illustrates the allocation for MA = MB = 1;  = 2; and several values of
: When  = 1, we return to the case of symmetric advertising markets, and the specic
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allocation displayed below is just one of the possible equilibrium allocations. The displayed
allocation for  = 1 is however the unique limit for the equilibrium allocations as  ! 1.
Figure 4: Allocation with Di¤erent Di¤usion

































Surprisingly, the largest rms enter the new market with a constant number of messages.
Intuitively, larger rms stand more to lose by shifting messages to market B and reaching
fewer potential customers. More formally, suppose (as is the case) that larger rms buy
a larger number of messages on the established market (A). Given the substitutability of
messages across markets, this increases the demand by smaller rms in the new market.
In equilibrium, this e¤ect exactly cancels the di¤erences in rm size, and the allocation
of messages on market B is at for all dual-homing rms. Compared to the single market
case, the new advertising market is then characterized by a strong presence of medium-size
rms, and by a longer tail of relatively smaller rms.
Proposition 5 also shows that the number of active rms in market A is determined
by the single market threshold, when supply is equal to MA (that is, it is as if market B
were not present). The total number of active rms is instead determined by the symmetric
competition threshold (when supply is equal to MA +MB). Finally, the equilibrium price
on the larger market pA is decreasing in the size of the smaller market , while the price on
the smaller market pB is independent of .
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5.3 Media Markets with Di¤erent Distributions
As we saw in Section 4, the key advantage of more targeted advertising markets is to allow
fewer rms to deliver messages to a more concentrated consumer population. We now shift
our attention to the role of the distribution of consumer characteristics for the competition
between di¤erent media markets.
We consider two advertising markets, j 2 fA;Bg and let the distribution of consumers
in market j be given by sx;j , j exp ( jx). We assume that the advertising market A has
a more concentrated distribution over consumer characteristics than advertising market B,
or A > B. As the distribution of consumers across advertising markets is now assumed
to be di¤erent, it follows that not all consumer will be dual-homing. In particular, if a rm
x has a larger presence in market A, then all its potential customers are present in market
A, but only a subset of them is present in market B. Given that A > B, this is the case
for the larger rms, for which sx;A > sx;B. The converse holds for the smaller rms, which
have more consumers in market B. If we denote the matching technology by  (m), we can
write the objective function of a large rm x (for which sx;A > sx;B) as:




In other words, rm x perceives market B as a lower-quality substitute, analogous to a
market with a smaller user base. Market A plays a similar role for smaller rms, for which
sx;A < sx;B. It follows that larger rms have an incentive to focus on medium A and to
disregard medium B.
The equilibrium allocation is now characterized by three threshold rms, X < Y < Z,
and in particular:
1. The largest rms x 2 [0; X] only buy on market A:
2. A set of medium-sizedrms x 2 [X;Y ] buy on both markets. These rms divide
their purchases in varying proportions. In particular, the demand for messages in
market A is decreasing in x, while the demand on market B is increasing in x. The
total demands are decreasing in x.
3. The relatively smaller rms x 2 [Y; Z] only buy on market B.
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In equilibrium, the more concentrated market attracts the largest, most valuable, rms.
In particular, large rms advertise exclusively on the more concentrated market, while a
subset of medium-sized rms advertise on both, and relatively smaller rms only advertise
on the more di¤use market, where they can reach a larger fraction of their consumers.
The cuto¤ values X, Y and Z solve the market clearing conditions given the demand
functions. The equilibrium market shares do not allow for an explicit expression in the
case of di¤erent concentration levels, and the details of the equilibrium construction are
presented in Appendix B. In Figure 5, we show the allocations of messages mx;A and mx;B
as a function of A.
Figure 5: Allocation with Di¤erent Concentrations, B = 1, MA = 1, MB = 1.













































































For large di¤erences in the concentration levels j , all dual homing rms x 2 [X;Y ]
satisfy sx;A < sx;B, which means they are located to the right of the crossing point of the
two density functions. For small di¤erences in the concentration levels, all x 2 [X;Y ] satisfy
sx;A > sx;B. For a given choice of the parameters (B;MA;MB), the number of dual-homing
rms (Y  X) is non monotonic in A, and it is equal to zero for a single value A = A:
When this is the case, the marginal rm X = Y has an identical share of consumers in each
of the two distributions.
The results in this section provide two kinds of insights into the interaction of online
and o­ ine advertising markets. Indeed, we can view each online advertising market as a
separate medium with a higher concentration of consumers. With this interpretation, the
prediction of the model is that Internet advertising induces the largest, most protable
advertisers to switch away from the o­ ine medium, and to advertise only on the more
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concentrated online markets.
In this sense, competition by a more concentrated (targeted) market is very di¤erent
from an (identical) emerging market with a smaller user base. In the former case, the
established media lose the most valuable rms, as these rms nd a more protable market
where to reach their customers. In the latter case, the established media share the largest
buyers with the new media, and actually hold a relatively favorable position (in terms of
the allocation of messages purchased by the largest rms).
In an alternative interpretation, we can view market B as the newer medium, such
as the Internet, with a relatively larger presence of consumers of small (long tail) rms.
Competition with a more concentrated (established) market would then cause the demand
for messages by smaller rms to completely crowd out the demand of large rms, and
partially o¤set the demand of medium-size rms. In this sense, online advertising increases
the number of rms that have access to messages in equilibrium, and allows for a more
signicant participation of smaller rms.
6 O­ ine vs. Online Media
The internet has introduced at least two technological innovations in advertising, namely
(a) the ability to relate payments and performance (e.g. pay per click), and (b) an improved
ability to target advertisement messages to users. We now focus on the latter aspect, and in
particular on the equilibrium allocation of advertising when both traditional and targeted
media are present.
The targeted markets represent specialized websites, and messages can be thought of
as display advertisements. We therefore refer to the traditional medium as o­ ine, and
to the many targeted markets as online.We then consider a population of dual-homing
consumers, who spend a total time of MA on the o­ ine medium and MB on the online,
targeted, medium. More specically, skMB denotes the supply on each targeted market
k  0.
Because of the risk of duplication, messages sent online and o­ ine are strategic substi-
tutes for each rm. This is not the case for messages sent on two di¤erent online markets,
since each consumer only visits one website (in addition to the o­ ine market). Therefore, if
rm x sends a total of mx non targeted messages and mx;k messages on each online market
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(sx;k(1  e mx mx;k=sk)  pkmx;k)dk   pmx.
The analysis of rmsadvertising choices between o­ ine and online media is intricate. In
general, each rm x will want to advertise on a subset of the online markets k  x where
its consumers are located (see Figure 2), and some rms will also advertise o­ ine. Both for
tractability concerns, and to focus on the revenue implications of competition and targeting,
we assume that the online medium allows to perfectly target messages to consumers. We
then ask what is the equilibrium unit price of advertisement messages, and how it is a¤ected
by each rms demands o­ ine.
6.1 Perfect Targeting
With perfect targeting, each advertising market k is only visited by consumers of product






Equation (16) implies that in equilibrium, given the supply of messages on each market,
each rm reaches a constant fraction 1 exp ( MB) of its customers.4 Equation (17) shows
that the more rm x advertises o­ ine, the lower the price on the corresponding online
market k = x. This is again a consequence of the substitutability of messages across media.
We now turn to the message demands o­ ine. Since each rm reaches a constant fraction
1 exp ( MB) of its customers online, the supply of messages online simply acts as a scaling
factor for each rms demand function o­ ine. Intuitively, each rm now has sx exp ( MB)
4Strictly speaking, we should interpret this as the limit of a model with a discrete number of product and
advertising markets. In the discrete model, all consumers of product x are located in the advertising market
k = x. Each rm x only advertises in the online market k = x, supply is proportional to the number of
consumers in the market, and as a consequence, the probability of a match is constant across rms. These
results hold independently of the number of products and markets, and carry over to our continuous model.
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2MA   x: (19)
Equations (18) and (19) show that the equilibrium distribution of o­ ine messages across
the participating rms, as well as the number of active rms, are both identical to the
single market case. However, competition has a clear e¤ect on the equilibrium prices and
revenues, as we show in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium Prices)
1. The equilibrium price on the o­ ine medium is given by
p =  exp( MB  
p
2MA):
2. The equilibrium prices on the online markets are given by
pk =
8<: exp(k  MB  
p
2MA); for k  X,
exp( MB); for k > X.
Consistent with intuition, the o­ ine price p is decreasing in MB, reecting the drop in
each rms willingness to pay for regular advertisements in the presence of an alternative,
better targeted market. In other words, the presence of a targeted online market does not
modify the composition of the o­ ine market but lowers the equilibrium prots. The prices
in the online markets are initially increasing in k, and then constant. This reects the allo-
cation of messages o­ ine, where relatively smaller rms buy a lower number of messages,
and are willing to pay more for MB messages per capita online. Furthermore, the prices
online are constant for all those markets (rms) who do not participate in the o­ ine market.
In other words, nicheonline markets, where customers of long tail rms are likely to be
present, are not a¤ected at all by media competition. In this sense, as emphasized by An-
derson (2006), online advertising allows to reach new segments of the consumer population,
which are distinct from the intended audience of the rms that actively advertise o­ ine.
Finally, we seek to compare the interaction between online and o­ ine media, with the
competition between o­ ine media. We take the point of view of a o­ ine market, and focus
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on the e¤ect of competition on the equilibrium price. For the purpose of this comparison, we
consider two cases: (i) competition between an o­ ine market and a continuum of perfectly
targeted online markets; (ii) competition between two symmetric non-targeted markets.
We interpret the supply as the outcome of the consumers time allocation decisions. In
particular, we assume each consumer spends a fraction  of her time M in the o­ ine
market. We then have MA = M and MB = (1  )M , with the understanding that, in
the case of o­ ine vs. online media competition, the o­ ine medium is denoted by A and
the online medium by B. On the basis of the previous results, the equilibrium price in the




2M + (1  )M)); with an online competitor,
 exp( 
p
2M); with an o­ ine competitor.
(20)
We can now draw conclusions on how di¤erent kinds of competition a¤ect the equilibrium
revenues of o­ ine media.
Proposition 7 (Price Comparison)
The equilibrium price of messages in the o­ ine market is lower under competition by the
online markets, compared to competition by an o­ ine medium if and only if
 < (M=2)(1  )2(1 
p
) 2.
Proposition 7 shows that if product markets are di¤use ( is low), the equilibrium price
of advertising on the o­ ine market falls more when competing against perfectly targeted
markets. Conversely, for highly concentrated product markets, an o­ ine competitor is more
detrimental to the prots of a o­ ine market. Intuitively, consider the case of symmetric
competition when  is high: the two media are competing for a few valuable buyers, and the
outcome is closer to Bertrand competition. Finally, as the consumer spends more time on
the competing market (the lower ), competition by a targeted medium becomes even less
attractive, relatively to competition by a o­ ine market with the same capacity. In other
words, the progressive growth of online advertising markets is shown to be more detrimental




When we consider imperfect targeting levels, our predictions are similar to those of the
model with di¤erent degrees of concentration. In particular, the online market k = 0 is
a close substitute for the o­ ine medium, as all consumer types are present (though with
di¤erent intensities). Consider the hierarchical structure of the advertising markets on
a targeted medium. If rm x advertises on all markets k  x, then it can reach all of
its customers both o­ ine and online. This means the two media are perfect substitutes,
and the prices would have to make the rm indi¤erent, in order to justify dual homing.
Therefore, the price o­ ine must be to equal a weighted average of the prices on the online





Clearly, this condition cannot hold for more than one rm. In equilibrium, it must then
be the case that rms [xL; xH ] advertise o­ ine, while no rm x > xL advertises on online
market k = 0. The message is similar to the model with di¤erent concentrations. Indeed, the
two models are very close, as the concentration parameter of the distribution of consumers
on market 0 is equal to  + . As a result, the largest rms leave the o­ ine medium and
advertise exclusively online, in the largest markets k, leading to a decrease in the price of
the o­ ine medium.
This e¤ect is somewhat mitigated if the online market has a smaller user base. As in
the case of competition between o­ ine media of di¤erent sizes, we can show that all rms
larger than a critical x advertise both o­ ine and on all the available online markets (i.e.,
each rm x buys messages on markets k 2 [0; x]). In terms of comparative statics, better
targeting reduces the demand for online messages by long tailrms, and induces a higher
concentration in the o­ ine medium. At the same time, larger rms are also able to reach
a larger fraction of their customers online, and this reduces the overall protability of the
o­ ine medium. As a consequence, the o­ ine price p and the number of rms participating




The analysis so far has considered competitive advertising markets with uniform, market-
clearing, unit prices for advertising messages. In this section we explore the possibility that
each advertising market is owned by a single or a few publishers who seek to maximize rev-
enues by a menu of quantity and price pairs. We rst focus on the problem of a monopolist
with the ability to price discriminate across di¤erent advertising rms, while keeping the
total number of available messages xed. We then return to a model with unit prices, and
consider the e¤ects of endogenizing the total supply of messages.
7.1 Menu Pricing
We focus on a single advertising market, in which a single publisher sells M messages to a
continuum of advertisers via nonlinear pricing schedules. The type of each advertiser is his
rank in the product market, x. A strategy for the single publisher can be represented by a
direct mechanism as a pair of functions, m (x) and p (x), assigning a number of messages
and a total payment to each rm x. The indirect utility of rm x is then given by
U (x) = max
x̂
[e x(1  e m(x̂))  p(x̂)].





(e x(1  e m(x))  U (x))dx:
The publishers choice of m (x) and U (x) is constrained by the local incentive compatibility
requirement
U 0 (x) =  2e x(1  e m(x)),
by the monotonicity requirement,
m0 (x)  0,
and by the total capacity M , so thatZ 1
0
m (x) dx M .
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In the absence of production costs, the monopolist wants to sell as many units as possible,
hence the capacity constraint is binding. The X largest rms participate, and the optimal
message allocation is given by
m (x) = 





where the logarithmic term di¤erentiates the price discriminating monopolists from the
competitive solution. Notice that, given X, each rm x  X receives more messages in the
current specication. The equilibrium set of active rms is given by [0; X], where X is




(1  X) e X dx =M . (21)
The marginal prices charged by the publisher can be easily characterized in terms of the
nonlinear tari¤ p (m) through the advertisersrst order condition
e xe m = p0 (m) . (22)
We therefore establish the following properties of the revenue maximizing allocation.
Proposition 8 (Revenue Maximization)




X   x+ ln 1 x1 X

; if x  X,
0; if x > X,
where X is given by the solution of (21).
2. The number of active rms X is strictly increasing in M and strictly decreasing in





3. The average unit price p (m) =m is decreasing in m.
4. The publishers revenue is increasing in  and in M , and converges to e 1 as either
!1 or M !1.
The revenue maximizing allocation di¤ers from the competitive one along several di-
mensions. First, compared to the competitive allocation, the equilibrium quantities are
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distorted downwards. For a given X, the revenue maximizing allocation assigns more mes-
sages to larger rms, since the term ln 1 x1 X is decreasing. Second, fewer rms participate
in equilibrium, and the largest rms receives more messages than in the competitive alloca-
tion. This is possible because the publisher can price di¤erentially and extract more surplus
from the advertisers. Third, the number of active rms is bounded from above by 1=, and
the publishers equilibrium revenue converges to a positive number as M ! 1. This is
in sharp contrast with the competitive case, where the number of active rms increases
without bound as M !1, and revenues vanish. Finally, unit prices are decreasing in the
volume m of messages purchases. As expected, the publisher o¤ers quantity discounts.
7.2 Endogenous Capacity and Competition
What happens if the publisher can choose the capacity M instead? In the single rm
case, there exists an optimal M , while more capacity is always more protable in the price
discrimination model. However, the analysis of competition among publishers is a natural
question to address at this stage.
Suppose that more than one publisher is present in the advertising market. As in
the analysis of market interaction, suppose that each consumer divides her time equally
across two or more publishers. We are therefore motivated to analyze competition among
n identical publishers as a Cournot game, with advertising volume as the strategic variable.
Each consumer spends a total time of M=n on each publication. Each publisher chooses
what level of capacity qj 2 [0;M=n] to place on the market. Clearly, each publisher could ll
the entire time with messages, or withhold some capacity and keep prices high. Following
our analysis in Section 5, we know the equilibrium price of messages is given by
p (q) =  exp( 
p
2jqj).
The resulting symmetric equilibrium quantities and price are given by
q = min fM=n; 2n=g ,
p = maxfe 2n; e 
p
2Mg.
In the next proposition, we relate the imperfect competition prices and quantities with the
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competitive equilibrium benchmark.
Proposition 9 (Imperfect Competition)
For any M , there exists n (M) ,
p
M=2 such that, for all n  n (M), imperfect compe-
tition yields the competitive benchmark outcome.
In particular, notice that the capacity constraints imply that imperfect competition will
have no impact on the equilibrium outcomes if the number of publishers is high enough.
Intuitively, each publishers incentives to withhold capacity are highest in the monopoly
case. Thus, our benchmark model may be viewed as describing a framework in which
publishers have market power, but the number of competitors is high relatively to the time
allocated to the medium.
Finally, consider the case of competitive menu pricing. Suppose that publishers can
adopt menu pricing. Remember that messages bought on di¤erent media are perfect sub-
stitutes for advertisers. If publishers o¤er incentive compatible tari¤s as the one described
above, advertisers will buy their entire supply from a single publisher, so as to exploit
declining unit prices. Given the menus o¤ered by competitors, each publisher will then
want to cut prices for the most lucrative market segments, in this case the small advertisers
who are paying high unit prices. It follows that in equilibrium all sales must take place
at a constant unit price. Therefore, given the capacity constraints, the nonlinear pricing
problem reduces to a capacity choice for each publisher.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a novel model to understand and evaluate the implications
of targeting in advertising markets. The model provided a framework for the systematic
analysis of the trade-o¤s that arise due to changes in the targeting technology. We adopted
a hierarchical framework to rank products and advertising markets of di¤erent sizes. We
explored in particular the tension between competition and value extraction. This tension
appears as general issue as the targeting ability of the various media improve. In this sense,
our model can provide insight into the e¤ects of detailed users information in the hands of
social networks and on the protability of IP address tracking.
The analysis we have presented is the outcome of a number of modeling choices which
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constrain the scope of our results in some directions. We now conclude by discussing two
directions for future research. The price of advertising was determined in a competitive
equilibrium model. While the competitive equilibrium is the natural benchmark, it would
be of interest to consider the implications of other pricing rules for advertising messages.
Clearly, the auctions for keywords in the sponsored search environment or the emerging ad
exchange model might o¤er valuable additional insights in this respect.
In our model, the advertisers were competing for messages but they were not competing
for consumers. The competition among rms for advertising messages therefore did not
interact with their competition in the product market. A natural next step therefore might
enrich the current model with advertisers which are directly competing in the product
markets. The equilibrium price for advertising, in particular in highly targeted markets,
may then become more responsive to the intensity of competition on the product market.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (1.)(4.) The comparative statics results can be derived directly
by di¤erentiating expressions (7), (8), and (9) in the text.







and the total number of consumers reached is
sx(1  e m

x) = e x(1  ex 
p
2M ):











ez   1 ,
which is decreasing in z (with z =
p
2M   x), and therefore increasing in x: It is also
decreasing in  if x <
p
M=2 (which represents the median active rm).
(6.) The average probability of a match, which is equal to the total fraction of consumers













which is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 2. (1.)(2.) The competitive equilibrium described in the
text leads to uniform prices pk across advertising markets. Therefore, for each rm and for
each market, the marginal returns to messages are equalized. Since the match production
function is concave in m, this allocation maximizes the probability of a match given the
available supply of messages.
(3.) The average probability of a match now takes into account the fraction of consumers
reached in the exterior market as well as in the interior markets. It is given by,










where mx;k is given by (15) in the text. Therefore, we obtain







which is increasing in  and .
Proof of Proposition 3. (1.)(4.) These statements follow from di¤erentiation of
expressions (13), (14), and (15) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the rst order conditions for rm x, we obtain





























and the results follow as in the single-homing case.














  pB = 0:





mB = mB =  ln
pA   pB
pB (1  )
; for x 2 [0; X] :
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For all rms x 2 [X;Z] ; we havemA = 0 andmB =  (ln=pB   x) as in the single-homing
case. Since by construction, the marginal rm X satises mX;A = 0, we have
(1  ) exp ( X) = pA   pB. Similarly, we have mZ;B = 0, and so  exp ( Z) = pB.










mBdx = X (Z  X) +
Z Z
X






















which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. The price o­ ine is equal to  exp ( X), where X is the
marginal rm characterized in (18). The prices o­ ine follow from substitution of (19) into
(16) and (17).
Proof of Proposition 7. The inequality in the text follows from directly comparing
the two expressions for the p in (20), and solving for .
Proof of Proposition 8. (1.) The modied Hamiltonian is








+ b (M  m)
where a (x) and b are the multipliers on the incentive constraint and on the capacity con-
straint. The rst order conditions are given by:
e xe m   a2e xe m = b; a0 (x) = 1; a (0) = 0:
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Therefore, we have
a (x) = x;




b = e X (1  X) .





(1  X) e X dx =M;
and by dening z := X, we obtain
1
2
z2   z   ln (1  z) = M . (23)
(2.) The left-hand side of (23) is increasing in z, and therefore z is increasing in M , and
z (M) 2 [0; 1]. Furthermore, z ! 1 (so X !  1) as M ! 1. We can derive the last
comparative statics result from








=   (1  z) ln (1  z) + 1
2
z (z + 1) (z   2) < 0.
(3.) From the buyers rst order condition, we know that e x(m)e m = p0 (m), where
x (m) is determined by:
ln
(1  x) e x
(1  X) e X  m = 0.
Di¤erentiating, we obtain
p00 (m) =  e x(m)e m
 










Finally, since p (0) = 0, the concavity of the function p (m) implies that p (m) =m is decreas-
ing.
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  (1  X)e X ln 1  x
1  X .
Revenues are given by
R X











dx = X22e X = z2e z.
Since R (z) is increasing for z 2 [0; 1], we conclude that R is increasing in  and M .
Furthermore, z ! 1 implies R! e 1.
40
Appendix B
This Appendix contains the construction of the competitive equilibrium with competing
media markets and di¤erent consumer concentrations across media markets.
The case of sX;A > sX;B We begin with the case of sX;A > sX;B. Consider the objective











  pAmA   pBmB:








  pA = 0;
e mBe mABe
 Bx   pB = 0:
By construction, the marginal rm satises mX;A > 0 and mX;B = 0. The indi¤erence






= pA   pB,
and therefore, from the rst order conditions,









Similarly, the marginal rm Y has mY;A = 0 and mY;B > 0: Therefore, indi¤erence requires
Ae
 AY   Be BY = pA   pB.
Since we know from the marginal rm X that pA > pB, we also know Ae AY > Be BY ,
that is, all rms active on both media will lie before the crossing point of the two density
functions. Furthermore, for all the dual-homing rms x 2 [X;Y ], we know both rst order
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Finally, exploiting the two conditions mY;A = 0 and mX;B = 0, we obtain the equilibrium
prices as a function of the cuto¤ rms:
pA = Ae
 XA Ae




 Y A   Be Y B
Ae XA   Be XB
:

































dx = MB; (25)













Ae Y A   Be Y B
:
We can then substitute the expressions for pA; pB, and Z into (24) and (25), solve them
numerically for the two unknowns X and Y , and verify that X < Y < h (A; B), where
h (A; B) = (lnA   lnB) = (A   B)
represents the crossing point of the two distributions.
The case of sX;A < sX;B Next we consider the case of sX;A < sX;B. Consider the











  pAmA   pBmB:
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The rst order conditions are given by
Ae








  pB = 0:
By construction, mX;A > 0 and mX;B = 0. Again, indi¤erence requires that
Ae
 AX   Be BX = pA   pB:

















For all the dual-homing rms x 2 [X;Y ], we know both rst order conditions must hold


















Ae Y A   Be Y B
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 Y A   Be Y B
Ae XA   Be XB
:
Again, we can use the expressions for pA; pB, and Z, solve the market clearing conditions
numerically, and verify that h (A; B) < X < Y:
The case of sX;A = sX;B We conclude the construction of the equilibrium by consid-
ering sX;A = sX;B For the marginal rms X and Y to be both equal to h (A; B) =










ln (A=B) : (26)
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